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CASE COMMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AND CIVIL COMMITMENT
Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993)
Michael J. Furbush*
The State of Kentucky committed respondents to treatment facilities

according to its statutory procedures for involuntary civil commitment of
mentally retarded persons.' Respondents filed a class action suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky challenging the constitutionality of Kentucky's civil commitment statute. 2 In part,
respondents claimed that the state code provision permitting guardians and
immediate family members to participate as parties to commitment proceedings3 violated the Due Process Clause because it "skew[ed] the balance" of the proceedings against the retarded individual.4 The district
* This comment is dedicated to my mother.
I. Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1993). Kentucky's statute requires proof of
the following four assertions by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) The person is a mentally retarded person;
(2) The person presents a danger or a threat of danger to self, family, or others;
(3) The least restrictive alternative mode of treatment presently available requires placement in an [intermediate care facility for mentally retarded persons];
(4) Treatment that can reasonably benefit the person is available in an [intermediate care
facility for mentally retarded persons].
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (Baldwin 1991).
2. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2640. Suit originally was filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Doe ex rel. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, 110 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). Kentucky amended its civil commitment
statutes several times following initiation of the action, with each revised version being challenged by
respondents. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2640. The Court limited its opinion to issues raised in litigation
concerning the procedures enacted in 1990. Id.
3. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2640. Section 202B.160(3) provides that:
(3) Guardians and immediate family members of the respondent shall be allowed to
attend all hearings, conferences or similar proceedings; may be represented by private counsel, if desired; may participate in the hearings or conferences as if a party to the proceedings; may cross-examine witnesses if desired; and shall have standing to appeal any adverse
decision.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(3) (Baldwin 1991).
4. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2648. Respondents also raised an equal protection challenge to the statute because it provides separate procedures for civil commitment of the mentally ill and civil commitment of the mentally retarded. Id. at 2640. The scope of this comment does not include analysis of the
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court agreed, holding that third party participation by guardians and family
members, when their interests may be opposed to those of the individual
confronting commitment, imposed a burden on the individual and consequently violated due process.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision and Kentucky petitioned for certiorari. 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, that under the
three-factor balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge,' participation by close
relatives and guardians as parties to civil commitment proceedings did not
constitute a deprivation of procedural due process.8
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state
governments9 from depriving individuals of a constitutionally protected
liberty or property interest without due process of law." Procedural due
process concerns each person's right to have the grounds for and legality
of a deprivation determined in a fair proceeding." In Mathews, the Supreme Court announced the current standard used by the Court to determine how much process is due an individual whose protected liberty or
property interest is being deprived by government action.' 2
In Mathews, the respondent was a disabled worker whose disability
insurance benefits were terminated without a prior hearing by the state
arm of the Social Security Administration. 3 Rather than seek reconsideration, respondent challenged the constitutional validity of the procedures
used to verify continuing disability.' 4 As an analytical framework for
reviewing the constitutionality of the agency's termination procedures, the
Court set forth a balancing test weighing three distinct factors: the individual interest that will be affected by government action; the possibility of
an erroneous deprivation of the individual's interest and the possible benefit of additional safeguards; and the government's interest.'" The Mathews
equal protection issues in the instant case.
5. Cowherd, 965 F.2d at 113.
6. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642, 2648.
7. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
8. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2648.
9. The Fifth Amendment places the same due process requirement on the federal government.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
11. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1 (4th
ed. 1991) (providing an introductory explanation of procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
12. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
13. Id. at 323-25. The agency rendered its decision based only on medical reports obtained from
respondent's physician and a psychiatric consultant. Id. at 324.
14. Id. at 324-25. Respondent relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which established an individual's right to an evidentiary hearing prior
to termination of welfare benefits. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325.
15. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. For an historical evaluation of the Mathews test, see JERRY L.
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Court held that an individual's interest in uninterrupted disability benefits
was outweighed by the minimal risk of an erroneous deprivation and the
government's interest in conserving its scarce fiscal and administrative
resources.1 6 Thus, due process did not require the government to hold an

evidentiary hearing before terminating respondent's disability benefits. 7
The Mathews Court recognized that due process is flexible and that
procedural schemes should be examined according to the particular circumstances in which they are applied."8 Mathews thus introduced the notion of variable due process, which purported to resolve due process ques-

tions more efficiently by using a cost-benefit analysis as opposed to the
more restrictive, traditional technique of adjudicative decision based on
stare decisis."9 Far from the model of efficiency anticipated by the Court,
subsequent applications of the Mathews criteria have been inconsistent and

results frequently irrational.'
For example, the Court applied a narrow version of the Mathews test
to discretionary parole release decisions in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex.2 Because early release from
incarceration is not a fundamental right, the Greenholtz Court had to first

MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIvE STATE 103-04 (1985). The author posits that
Mathews reversed the trend towards extending greater procedural protections to individual plaintiffs
which culminated in Goldberg. Id. at 104. Until Mathews, the Court equated the state's interest with
accurate decisionmaking and accuracy with hearings. Id. Due process balancing thus heavily favored
the private claimant's demand for increased procedural protection. Id. Mathews tipped the scales the
other way by including accuracy as a discrete factor in the due process calculus. Id. Consequently, a
new due process orthodoxy emerged which viewed procedure as a means of achieving generally correct decisions, rather than correct decisions in all cases. Id. Professor Mashaw and other constitutional
scholars pejoratively characterize the doctrinal shift as "instrumentalist" or "utilitarian" because it
subordinates the intrinsic value of the process as a fundamental, individual right to a mere balancing of
broader societal interests. Id. at 104-05.
16. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342-49.
17. Id. at 349.
18. Id. at 334.
19. See MASHAW, supra note 15, at 102-03.
20. See id. at 112. In Mathews, for instance, the Court distinguished the respondent's private
interest from that of the welfare recipient's in Goldberg. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. According to the
Court, a disabled worker's need for assistance was likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient's
because eligibility is not based on financial need. Id. at 340. Consequently, while the Court conceded
that the hardship imposed by an erroneous termination of benefits may be substantial, the availability
of other forms of government aid, in addition to the possibility of private resources, puts a disabled
worker who falls below the poverty line in a better position than a corresponding welfare recipient
who is "on the very margin of subsistence." Id. at 340-41. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that
after respondent's benefits were terminated there was a foreclosure on the family's home and the
family's furniture was repossessed. Id. at 250 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. 442 U.S. 1 (1979). The Greenholtz Court reversed a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which modified the statutory procedures for early release. Id. at 5-6, 16.
In part, the court of appeals ordered a full formal hearing for each parole candidate and a written
explanation, including a statement of the evidence relied upon, if parole is denied. Id. at 6.
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determine whether the Nebraska statute created a protectible liberty interest.22 The Court found that the statutory language generated a private
expectation of release that was entitled to a limited degree of constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause. 3
Having thus opened Nebraska's discretionary parole release procedures
to due process scrutiny under the Mathews test, the Greenholtz Court
focused exclusively on one factor, the risk of erroneous deprivations.24
Implicit in this single-minded devotion to accuracy was the relative insignificance the Court attached to the inmates' private liberty interest inherent
in an expectation of release. Under this abridged version of the
Mathews test, the Court concerned itself only with whether the release
procedures provided adequate protection against the risk of error.26 Because Nebraska-based parole decisions primarily on inmates' files, the
Court held that the statutory requirement of an informal hearing sufficiently ensured accurate decisions. 7 An informal hearing gave the inmate an
opportunity to verify that the pertinent records were the inmate's own and
to state any special circumstances that favored parole.28 Due process, concluded the Greenholtz Court, did not require more. 9
Less than one month after Greenholtz, the Court applied the Mathews
balancing test to Georgia's procedures for the voluntary civil commitment
of children in Parham v. J.R.3" In Parham, several institutionalized minor

22. Id. at 7 (noting that criminal conviction extinguishes the inherent right to be free from confinement). The Court also emphasized that states are under no obligation to establish a parole system.
Id.
23. Id. at 12 (commenting that recognition of a protectible statutory entitlement is provided on a
case-by-case basis).
24. Id. at 13. The court stated:
Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and quality of the process
due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the
risk of error.
Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The dissent criticized the majority's exclusive reliance on the
second factor of the Mathews test. Id. at 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall noted
that by ignoring the other two factors of the test, the Court "skew[ed] the inquiry in favor of the
Board." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). For example, Justice Marshall wondered why the private
interest in being released from prison had no bearing on the process due. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part).
25. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
26. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13, 16.
27. Id. at 15. In his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that inmate files are often inaccurate and
that the instant case contained evidence of such errors. Id. at 33 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
Therefore, Justice Marshall saw no reason for overturning the court of appeals decision that additional
procedures were necessary to diminish the risk of error. Id. at 33-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id.
30. 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979). Because the law historically presumes that parents are more
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children brought a class action suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
Georgia's procedures for the voluntary commitment of children under the
age of eighteen violated the Due Process Clause.3" The issue before the
Court was whether due process required a judicial hearing to review pa-

rental decisions to commit their mentally ill or mentally retarded children.32 The Parham Court considered all three Mathews factors separately
in its analysis."3 Addressing first the private interests affected, the Court
asserted that the interest of the child in avoiding commitment was inseparable from the interest of the parent in the child's health and welfare.'
As such, the Court treated these concurrent interests as distinct but unified
elements within the first Mathews factor.3 For the child, the Court ob-

served that civil commitment potentially infringed not only the fundamental liberty interest in being free from bodily restraints, but also the interest

in not being erroneously labeled by an improper commitment decision.36
Nevertheless, the Court held that parents retain plenary authority to seek
institutional treatment for their children, subject to an independent examination and diagnosis by a physician.37
After addressing the State's interest in voluntary civil commitments,"
the Parham Court turned its attention to the risk of error. The Court held

that due process requires at minimum an informal inquiry by a "neutral
factfinder" to decide whether the statutory requirements for commitment
are satisfied.39 The Court added that states were free to adopt more for-

capable of making difficult decisions, it allows parents to substitute their judgment for that of their
children. See id. at 602. Commitment of a child to an institution in some states is thus considered a
voluntary admission. Id. at 603-04.
31. Id. at 588.
32. See id. at 587.
33. Id. at 599-617.
34. Id. at 600.
35. Id. at 600-04.
36. Id. at 600-01 (following Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979)). Justice Brennan
suggested other negative consequences of civil commitment in a separate opinion. Id. at 626-27
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan pointed out that committed
individuals are "deprived of friends, family, and community." Id. at 626 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Moreover, they are forced to live in unfamiliar surroundings under the
constant supervision of strangers. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They also
are subjected to intrusive treatments. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. Id. at 602, 604 (holding that the traditional presumption that parents act in the best interests
of their children should apply).
38. Id. at 604-06. The Court described three significant state interests as follows: (1) restricting
the use of its expensive mental health facilities to cases of actual need; (2) avoiding procedural obstacles that would discourage individuals or their families from seeking psychiatric care when the individual is mentally ill; and (3) admitting patients for treatment without wasting time on procedural machinations. Id. at 604-05.
39. Id. at 606-07 (commenting that informal hearings will protect the child from erroneous decisions without unduly burdening the state, or discouraging parents from seeking governmental help).
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mal hearings, but carefully described the shortcomings of such measures.' First, the Court suggested that judicial hearings do not contribute
to the accuracy of commitment decisions because such hearings forced
untrained judges or administrative officials to make essentially medical or
psychiatric decisions. 1 Second, the Court observed that an adversarial
context would disturb the parent-child relationship and endanger the success of long-term treatment.42 Despite its apparent confidence in informal
hearings, the Parham Court conceded that informal hearings did present a
significant risk of error. 3 However, the Court stressed that the possibility
of error provided no rational grounds for holding a procedural scheme
followed in a majority of states unconstitutional." The Court therefore
concluded, after weighing the interests of the child, the parents, the state,
and the interest in accurate decisions, that due process did not require a
formal adversary hearing.4 5
Despite the factual similarities between the instant case and
Parham,46 the instant Court explicitly followed Greenholtz in focusing on
the accuracy prong of the Mathews test. 47 The instant Court found that
Kentucky's statutory provision allowing close family members and legal
guardians to participate as parties to civil commitments of the mentally
retarded did not adversely affect the accuracy of such proceedings. 8 Relying primarily on this finding, the instant Court held that the statute did
not infringe upon respondents' due process rights.49 In its application of
the Mathews factors, the instant Court focused primarily on its finding that
the procedures in place tended to reduce errors." The instant Court posited that accurate decisionmaking benefited from the formal participation of

40. Id. at 607, 609-10.
41. Id. at 609 ("Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed
protection of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the
commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real.").
42. Id. at 610 (noting that such negative results are likely to occur in an adversary hearing in
which the parents testify). The Court stated that long-range treatment could be compromised by the
possible exacerbation of tensions resulting from an adversary hearing. Id. Such tensions might also
make the committed individual's return home more difficult. Id.
43. Id. at 612 (noting that parents may mislead the physician, or the physician might make an
erroneous diagnosis).
44. Id. (citing more than 30 states which follow a similar scheme).
45. Id. at 613.
46. See supra notes 1-5, 30-32 and accompanying text. The instant Court cited Parham only for
the proposition that close relatives and guardians of a mentally retarded individual have a cognizable
interest in the individual's welfare. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2648-49.
47. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2649.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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guardians and family members." These parties, reasoned the instant
Court, often possessed useful information which reduced the risk of a
court rendering an erroneous commitment decision.52
While the increase in accuracy attributable to third party participation
by guardians and family members was the dominant factor in its decision,
the instant Court also alluded to the impact of the procedure on the State's
interest and on respondents' interest. 3 First, the instant Court noted that
formal involvement by guardians and family members furthered the State's
interest in giving those persons a voice in civil commitment proceedings.54 Second, the instant Court stated generally that the interest of a
person subject to state action is in the accuracy of the result, regardless of
its desirability.55 The instant Court conceded that third party participation
would on some occasions increase the probability of commitment. However, the instant Court found the increased probability of commitment immaterial because the respondents' private interest was in a more accurate result, not in a more favorable one.56 Thus, the instant Court's definition of
respondents' private interest was consistent with its overall focus on the
accuracy prong of the Mathews test.
The instant Court's decision to follow the Greenholtz accuracy-driven
version of Mathews is curious when one considers the disparate nature of
the private interests involved in the two cases. In Greenholtz, appellants'
interest in the expectation of parole was a relatively minor, statutorily
defined interest. 57 As a general proposition, the Greenholtz Court stated
that due process protections do not necessarily extend to liberty interests
created by positive law.5" Parole release decisions in particular, noted the
Court, present such sensitive choices that they are beyond the reach of
strict due process scrutiny.59 Implicit in the Greenholtz Court's examination of the Mathews factors was the notion that the appellants' liberty

51. See id. at 2648-49.
52. Id. The Court did not specify what "valuable information" family members or guardians
might provide, nor did it discuss how conferring party status on such individuals increases the likelihood that the information will reach the proceedings. See id.
53. See id. at 2649.
54. Id. (acknowledging guardians' legal obligation to further the interests of their wards). According to the instant Court, no legal precedent suggests "that the State's expertise and concern in these
matters is so superior to that of parents and other close family members" as to insist such persons
should be barred from intervention. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
58. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (noting that executive decisions need not comply with constitutional standards that enforce unmistaken deprivations).
59. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 45

interest warranted only a minimal amount of due process protection.'
With such an insignificant private interest at stake, the Court concentrated
exclusively on whether the statutory procedures minimized the risk of
error.

61

The nature of respondents' liberty interest in the instant case is analytically very different from that of the appellants' in Greenholt.6 1 It is, in
fact, identical to the liberty interest considered in Parham.63 Parham held
that civil commitment encroaches upon one's inherent right to be free
from unnecessary bodily restraints.' Moreover, the Parham Court identified a protectible liberty interest in avoiding the adverse social consequences of an erroneous commitment decision.65 In unexplained contravention of this valid precedent, the instant Court defined respondents'
private interest not in terms of fundamental liberties, but in terms of accuracy. 6
By describing the respondents' private interest in terms of accuracy
rather than fundamental liberty, the instant Court favored Kentucky's
commitment procedures over the respondents' interest, thus upsetting the
balance of the relevant inquiry.67 Instead of balancing three distinct factors as dictated by Mathews and Parham, the instant Court fused the private interest element of the test with the accuracy element of the test.68
Parham described the private interest threatened in civil commitment cases
in terms of the massive constraints civil commitment placed on individual
freedom and autonomy.69 The Parham Court balanced that significant
interest against both the state's interest and the broader societal interest in
accurate decisions.7" In contrast, by defining the respondents' private interest as the mere absence of erroneous commitment decisions, the instant
Court added no independent weight to the balancing because that idea was
already subsumed by the broader societal interest in accurate decisions
which comprises the second Mathews factor.7 Thus, the instant Court
deprived respondents of the weight of their fundamental liberty interest in
its due process calculus, which transformed the Mathews test into a simple

60. See supra text accompanying note 25.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
62. See supra notes 1-5, 21-23 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
64. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 601.
65. Id.
66. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2649.
67. See, e.g., Greenholz, 442 U.S. at 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the
Greenholtz majority tipped the balance similarly in the government's favor).
68. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2649.
69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
71. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2648-49.
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inquiry about the accuracy of the procedures."
The instant Court's conclusion, however, that the intervention of close
relatives and guardians results in more accurate decisions is inconsistent
with the Court's reasoning in Parham. The Parham Court held that an
informal hearing satisfied due process in part because the presumed errorreducing proficiency of a formal adversary hearing was largely
imagined.73 Nevertheless, the instant Court stated that family members
and guardians often provide valuable information to reviewing courts
which increases the accuracy of commitment decisions, but provided no
factual support for its assertion.74 Moreover, the instant Court failed to
acknowledge the policy reasons behind Parham's refusal to require a
formal hearing. The Parham Court was concerned that adversary contests
between parents and mentally incompetent children would damage the
family relationship and make long-term treatment more difficult.75 While
there is little reason to think that the weaknesses of an adversary hearing
would be any different in the instant case, the instant Court indicated no
similar concern for the potential harm to family relationships, or for the
deleterious effect on treatment.76 One can only speculate whether the
result would have been any different in the instant case if the due process
claim had been filed by a parent trying to prevent another relative from
intervening as a party to the civil commitment of a retarded child.
The discrepancies between Parham and the instant case are indicative
of the problems created by the Mathews regime of positivist responses to
due process questions.' Mathews invited result-oriented applications of
the variable due process standard. Judicial decisionmaking based on the
logical extension of precedent was usurped by a utilitarian approach based
on cost accounting and pure policy choices." The instant case demonstrates the fundamental flaw in the Mathews approach to due process
analysis. Unencumbered by traditional constraints on judicial decision, the
instant Court selected an irrational precedent for the basis of its opinion
and supported its decision with unconvincing rationale. Moreover, the

72. See Harvey Rochman, Note, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2705, 2724-25 (1992) (analyzing this phenomenon in mass tort claims and discussing the Court's
concentration on accuracy in procedural due process decisions). Commentators have argued that this
utilitarian emphasis on accuracy ignores dignitary values inherent in the Due Process Clause such as
autonomy, self-respect, and equality. See MASHAW, supra note 15, at 108-12 (describing the natural
rights tradition in administrative due process).
73. See Parham.442 U.S. at 607. 609.
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
76. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2648-49.
77. See generally MASt-AW, supra note 15, at 108-12 (critiquing the incoherent application by the
Court of the Mathews factors).

78. See id. at 104-08.
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instant case provides dangerous precedent for future courts applying the
Mathews criteria to civil commitment cases. By enervating the private
interest prong of the test and shifting the focus to accuracy, the Court
makes it easier for subsequent courts to tighten the Fourteenth Amendment
protections afforded to individuals facing involuntary commitment.
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